Last November, we reported on Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2010), and its potentially lethal effect on a cornerstone of Fair Housing actions: disparate impact and the application of the McDonnell-Douglas “burden-shifting” analysis.
However, on Friday, February 10, 2012, the parties withdrew the case from the US Supreme Court just a few weeks before the scheduled argument of February 29. The US Supreme Court granted the withdrawal.
The parties in the case were the City of St. Paul, Minnesota (namely, the Department of Neighborhood Housing and Property Improvement [DNHPI]), and property owners who allege that their homes were targeted by housing code enforcement personnel and their draconian treatment of so-called violations of the housing code. The Plaintiffs brought suit against the City of St. Paul and the DNHPI alleging that the city’s enforcement of its housing code had a disparate impact on minority home and property owners, “whose customers were mainly individuals or families with low incomes, with a large share of them — perhaps 60 to 70 percent — African-American tenants.”
As a cause of action, disparate impact and the McDonnell-Douglas “burden shifting” analysis were indispensible tools in the fight against housing discrimination. During the infancy of the Fair Housing Act, (passed in 1968) Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation decided that the four part “burden shifting” test, first used in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, both cases dealing with discrimination in the workplace, could be applied to housing discrimination cases. In the housing context, the Arlington Heights disparate impact claim turned on four factors: 1) A showing of discriminatory effect/impact, 2) Some showing of discriminatory intent, 3) The defendant’s justification, and 4) The relief requested by the plaintiff.
However, the court in Arlington Heights ruled that “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact … [such] impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination." Arlington Heights, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242. “A racially discriminatory intent, as evidenced by such factors as disproportionate impact, the historical background of the challenged decision, the specific antecedent events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporary statements of the decision makers, must be shown.”
Proving this discriminatory intent was what made disparate impact cases an invaluable weapon in the fight against housing discrimination. Arlington Heights held that proving discriminatory intent turned on three factors: 1) the impact of a discriminatory law or action by state authorities, 2) if the impact of such law or action is not determinative, other factors, such as legislative or administrative history, and 3) the shifting of the burden of proof to the state to prove it would have adopted the law or regulation at issue without discriminatory motives.
Gallagher v. Magner turned on whether these types of claims could still be brought under the Fair Housing Act. While some believe that such claims have serious issues pertaining to equal protection, the consensus in the fair housing community was that the court would have confirmed that disparate impact claim was a valid theory, but were not sure as to the what test the court would have chosen. Disparate impact continues to live to fight housing discrimination another day.
Showing posts with label disparate impact. Show all posts
Showing posts with label disparate impact. Show all posts
Treasure Island Plundered With 3.725 Million Dollar Settlement
In a rare, multi-million dollar settlement, the Code Enforcement Board (CEB) of The City of Treasure Island, agreed to pay the sum of 3.7 million dollars to Gulf Coast Recovery, and its proprietor, Matthew Schwarz in a settlement agreement after several unsuccessful attempts at litigation.
A small city on Florida’s gulf coast, Treasure Island’s population of 7,500 doubles during the winter months; the warm climate and attractive coastal location a favorite of vacationers and “snowbirds” (a Floridian term for retirees from northern states). As a result, the City of Treasure Island’s zoning scheme has come up with unique ordinances to deal with the ebb and flow of its population throughout the year.
The City created a limit on the number of times a “single family or two family dwelling” can change occupancy during a twelve month period in certain areas zoned for single-family dwellings, in order to keep vacationers and snowbirds from disrupting “the sense of community of its permanent residents.”
Gulf Coast Recovery (“GCR”) is a company licensed by the Florida Department of Children and Families to provide outpatient rehabilitation services to recovering drug and alcohol abusers at its treatment facility located In the City of Treasure Island. However, the company’s license does not allow it to provide in-patient or residential treatment. In order to circumvent this limitation, GCR rents or owns property in which its clients stay during the rehabilitation process.
Conflict between GCR and Treasure Island arose when neighbors to one of these properties in which GCR patients stayed, complained about excessive noise and disturbances from GCR patients. In response, Treasure Island sent Schwarz a “Code Enforcement Detail”, observing that Schwarz had “opened up two rehab houses on the island.” Schwarz was then ordered to provide information such as the number of tenants living in the properties Schwarz and GCR owned, the amount of turnover, and the length of the leases.
After some heated disputes with the CEB, Schwarz was determined to have breached the city’s zoning ordinances. Schwarz, GCR, and several of GCR’s patients then sued Treasure Island in the US District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that the city’s zoning code enforcement actions unlawfully discriminated against the residents of the halfway houses.
The case ultimately went to trial. The District Court found in favor of Treasure Island after a motion for summary judgment, stating that the apartments were not “dwellings” and that even if they were assumed to be dwellings, Schwarz and GCR failed to establish intentional discrimination.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit concluded that all the apartments were “dwellings” pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, and remanded the case back to district court to determine whether a fact issue existed as to whether living in the halfway houses was “necessary” to afford recovering substance abusers an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy them.” Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008).
On remand, Schwarz was successful. A jury verdict passed down in February 2010 held that Treasure Island’s attempt to close the halfway houses violated the fair housing act. After an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment (see Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 2010 WL 3747787 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010)), Treasure Island decided to settle the case with Schwarz and GCR for more than $3 million dollars. Though Schwarz claimed losses in excess of $7 million dollars, Schwarz found the settlement to be a fair agreement. As part of the settlement, the city also agreed to allow GCR to occupant turnover rates of up to six times per year in a total of four buildings that were zoned for residential, single family dwellings.
The City commission reportedly found the settlement to be “in the best interests of the city”, with the mayor concluding that “everyone is glad [the case] is done with.” One of GCR’s clients was also slated to receive $36,000 as a result of the case as well, for “emotional turmoil” caused by Treasure Island’s code enforcement efforts.
A small city on Florida’s gulf coast, Treasure Island’s population of 7,500 doubles during the winter months; the warm climate and attractive coastal location a favorite of vacationers and “snowbirds” (a Floridian term for retirees from northern states). As a result, the City of Treasure Island’s zoning scheme has come up with unique ordinances to deal with the ebb and flow of its population throughout the year.
The City created a limit on the number of times a “single family or two family dwelling” can change occupancy during a twelve month period in certain areas zoned for single-family dwellings, in order to keep vacationers and snowbirds from disrupting “the sense of community of its permanent residents.”
Gulf Coast Recovery (“GCR”) is a company licensed by the Florida Department of Children and Families to provide outpatient rehabilitation services to recovering drug and alcohol abusers at its treatment facility located In the City of Treasure Island. However, the company’s license does not allow it to provide in-patient or residential treatment. In order to circumvent this limitation, GCR rents or owns property in which its clients stay during the rehabilitation process.
Conflict between GCR and Treasure Island arose when neighbors to one of these properties in which GCR patients stayed, complained about excessive noise and disturbances from GCR patients. In response, Treasure Island sent Schwarz a “Code Enforcement Detail”, observing that Schwarz had “opened up two rehab houses on the island.” Schwarz was then ordered to provide information such as the number of tenants living in the properties Schwarz and GCR owned, the amount of turnover, and the length of the leases.
After some heated disputes with the CEB, Schwarz was determined to have breached the city’s zoning ordinances. Schwarz, GCR, and several of GCR’s patients then sued Treasure Island in the US District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that the city’s zoning code enforcement actions unlawfully discriminated against the residents of the halfway houses.
The case ultimately went to trial. The District Court found in favor of Treasure Island after a motion for summary judgment, stating that the apartments were not “dwellings” and that even if they were assumed to be dwellings, Schwarz and GCR failed to establish intentional discrimination.
On appeal, the 11th Circuit concluded that all the apartments were “dwellings” pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, and remanded the case back to district court to determine whether a fact issue existed as to whether living in the halfway houses was “necessary” to afford recovering substance abusers an “equal opportunity to use and enjoy them.” Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008).
On remand, Schwarz was successful. A jury verdict passed down in February 2010 held that Treasure Island’s attempt to close the halfway houses violated the fair housing act. After an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment (see Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 2010 WL 3747787 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2010)), Treasure Island decided to settle the case with Schwarz and GCR for more than $3 million dollars. Though Schwarz claimed losses in excess of $7 million dollars, Schwarz found the settlement to be a fair agreement. As part of the settlement, the city also agreed to allow GCR to occupant turnover rates of up to six times per year in a total of four buildings that were zoned for residential, single family dwellings.
The City commission reportedly found the settlement to be “in the best interests of the city”, with the mayor concluding that “everyone is glad [the case] is done with.” One of GCR’s clients was also slated to receive $36,000 as a result of the case as well, for “emotional turmoil” caused by Treasure Island’s code enforcement efforts.
Recent Cases (cont.)
Petty v. Portofino Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22935 (March 12, 2010)
The plaintiffs, Jeffrey, Cindy and Christopher Petty's charged defendants, the Portofino Council of Co-Owners, Inc., with violating the Fair Housing Act, along with violating state laws regulating defamation, libel, slander, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Defendant responded to the claims by filing a motion to dismiss.
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., 600 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2010)
African American homeowner, Patrick O. Ojo complained that the Farmers Group insurance practices resulted in disparate treatment under FHA as a result of insurance company’s use of credit scores as a qualifying factor in determining insurance rate. Complainant claims that using credit scores factor that had a “racially disparate impact”
The district court found that the there was reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) 15 USC § 1012 (b) and Texas Insurance Code sections 544.002; 544.002, 559.051 and 559.052 . According to the MFA no federal law can “invalidate or impair or supersede” any state law made to regulate the insurance business. In other words, the state law, in this case the Texas Insurance Code which permits the use of credit scoring, allows the insurers to get around the FHA law against disparate impact on minorities because the Texas Insurance Code permissive law. In this case the state law would pre-empt the federal law. In most cases, it is the federal law which pre-empts the state law.
Ojo appealed and the three judge panel reversed the decision and held that “Texas law does not reverse preempt” the FHA claim. However the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately certified the unprecedented question of whether the Texas Insurance Code, in fact, reverse preempts (or overrides) the FHA claim because it has a “legally sufficient non-discriminatory reason” under the Insurance Code for using the credit scoring factor resulting in disparate impact.
The plaintiffs, Jeffrey, Cindy and Christopher Petty's charged defendants, the Portofino Council of Co-Owners, Inc., with violating the Fair Housing Act, along with violating state laws regulating defamation, libel, slander, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Defendant responded to the claims by filing a motion to dismiss.
The Pettys purchased a home in Corpus Christi, Texas and claim that they were harassed by the defendant in a variety of ways including the disconnection of their phone lines, which interfered with providing the proper care for their deaf son. Additionally, reasonable accommodations were denied the plaintiffs by limiting their ability to take the son’s service dog through the building so that the dog could relieve itself outside. The plaintiff not only claims that the defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations for their deaf son but also regulated the plaintiff’s children’s access to common areas in the condominium which affected their accessiblity to the dwelling. Lastly the plaintiffs charged the defendant with intimidating potential buyers of the plaintiff’s condominium and denying their application.
The Plaintiffs brought a familial status claim under Fair Housing Act §§ 3604(a)-(b), and a section 3617 claim. The plaintiffs demonstarted that defendant's discrimination affected the availability of the housing, and not merely the habitability of the housing, as required to make to make a valid claim. The court denied the defendants motion to dismiss and stated that the plaintiff’s claims were valid. The court agreed that the defendant’s actions limited the tenant’s availability to housing by making the entrances to the condo inaccessible to the tenant’s children and pets. In addition, the defendant blocked the plaintiff’s attempt to sell the condo. This pecuniary loss is what the court used to establish the injury suffered by the plaintiffs, which is a required element of the FHA claim.
The plaintiffs also filed a Disability Claim under FHA §3604 (f) and 3617, which prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental [of a property] or in any other way making dwelling unavailable for sale or rent due to disability. The court found that the failure to make reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff's son constituted discrimination based on a person's disability.
The state claims made by the plaintiffs include Negligent Representation, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The plaintiffs were unable to satisfy the requirements for the first claim which alleged that the defendants negligently represented that the plaintiff/homeowner, Jeff Petty, was a hacker. For the second claim the plaintiff attempted to establish that there was a “confidence…to act with good conscience and good faith…” between the two parties, or a fiduciary duty, due to their association as co-owners. However, case law has established that no duty exists between co-owner associates.
Finally, the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress for any acts that occurred after to May 8, 2007. The plaintiff attempted to establish that there had been continued violation of the Fair Housing Act by including the claims prior to this date, however the motion to dismiss was granted for those claims regarding acts which took place before May 8, 2007 and outside of the statute of limitations.
Ojo v. Farmers Group, Inc., 600 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2010)
African American homeowner, Patrick O. Ojo complained that the Farmers Group insurance practices resulted in disparate treatment under FHA as a result of insurance company’s use of credit scores as a qualifying factor in determining insurance rate. Complainant claims that using credit scores factor that had a “racially disparate impact”
The district court found that the there was reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) 15 USC § 1012 (b) and Texas Insurance Code sections 544.002; 544.002, 559.051 and 559.052 . According to the MFA no federal law can “invalidate or impair or supersede” any state law made to regulate the insurance business. In other words, the state law, in this case the Texas Insurance Code which permits the use of credit scoring, allows the insurers to get around the FHA law against disparate impact on minorities because the Texas Insurance Code permissive law. In this case the state law would pre-empt the federal law. In most cases, it is the federal law which pre-empts the state law.
Ojo appealed and the three judge panel reversed the decision and held that “Texas law does not reverse preempt” the FHA claim. However the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately certified the unprecedented question of whether the Texas Insurance Code, in fact, reverse preempts (or overrides) the FHA claim because it has a “legally sufficient non-discriminatory reason” under the Insurance Code for using the credit scoring factor resulting in disparate impact.
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