Hoffman v. Option One Mortgage Corp. & H & R Block Mortgage Corp., 589 F.Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D.Ill. 2008).
Plaintiff may assert a disparate impact claim on the basis of discretionary pricing. Under these financing practices, minority buyers are substantially more likely to be charged more in discretionary fees than are white buyers, even when controlling for risk-related factors. Defendants' motion to dismiss denied.
Showing posts with label Discretionary Pricing Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Discretionary Pricing Policy. Show all posts
Expiration of Housing Voucher Does Not Toll Limitations Period
In Ortega v. Housing Authority of the City of Brownsville, 572 F.Supp.2d 829, (S.D. Tex. 2008) the Plaintiff's application for a housing voucher expired when he was unable to prove legal guardianship of his grandson. The Plaintiff alleged discrimination based on familial status in violation of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3602(k). This section defines "familial status" as "one or more individuals...being domiciled with (1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals; or (2) the designee or such parent or other person having such custody, with the written permission of such parent or other person.
The court had to decide whether the two year limitations period began to run on July 19, 2004 when the housing voucher was issued by the agency or whether it began to run on December 21, 2004 when the agency issued a letter to inform the Plaintiff that the voucher had expired and his application was canceled. The Plaintiff filed suit in December of 2006.
The Plaintiff argues that because he was injured again in May of 2006 when he reapplied and no voucher was issued, the continuing violation doctrine tolled the limitations period. The court rejected this argument. In its analysis, the court relied on Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1998) where that court "reasoned the continued violations doctrine was useful where individual acts or events may not be evident of discrimination except in cumulation over time." It also relied on Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th cir. 1983) where that court laid out three reqirements for continuing violations: 1) similar subject matter; 2) frequent violations; and 3) a minor degree of permanence.
The third requirement was most persuasive here as the Ortega court held that the violation of the voucher in 2004 "was sufficiently permanent to create a cause of action and put a reasonable person on notice that he could act to protect his rights."
The court had to decide whether the two year limitations period began to run on July 19, 2004 when the housing voucher was issued by the agency or whether it began to run on December 21, 2004 when the agency issued a letter to inform the Plaintiff that the voucher had expired and his application was canceled. The Plaintiff filed suit in December of 2006.
The Plaintiff argues that because he was injured again in May of 2006 when he reapplied and no voucher was issued, the continuing violation doctrine tolled the limitations period. The court rejected this argument. In its analysis, the court relied on Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1998) where that court "reasoned the continued violations doctrine was useful where individual acts or events may not be evident of discrimination except in cumulation over time." It also relied on Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th cir. 1983) where that court laid out three reqirements for continuing violations: 1) similar subject matter; 2) frequent violations; and 3) a minor degree of permanence.
The third requirement was most persuasive here as the Ortega court held that the violation of the voucher in 2004 "was sufficiently permanent to create a cause of action and put a reasonable person on notice that he could act to protect his rights."
Mortgage Brokers and Discretionary Pricing
In Taylor v. Accredited Home Lenders, 580 F.Supp.2d 1062 (S.D. Cal. 2008) the Plaintiffs alleged a facially neutral "discretionary pricing policy" had a disparate impact on African American borrowers. At issue was whether the injury suffered was the result of a single incident violation which would have placed the Plaintiff's complaint beyond the two year statute of limitations or whether the injury was the result of a continuing violation.
42 U.S.C. Sec.3613(1)A) requires that actions must be commenced "no later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice." The court agreed with the Plaintiffs and held that the issuance of each mortgage statement containing the inflated amount due constituted a new violation and that each payment of that inflated figure was a new violation. The court rejected the defendant's single incident theory that "the violation occurred and terminated when the loan closed." Id. at 1065.
The court relies on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.363(1982) and its explanation of the continuing violation doctrine.
42 U.S.C. Sec.3613(1)A) requires that actions must be commenced "no later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice." The court agreed with the Plaintiffs and held that the issuance of each mortgage statement containing the inflated amount due constituted a new violation and that each payment of that inflated figure was a new violation. The court rejected the defendant's single incident theory that "the violation occurred and terminated when the loan closed." Id. at 1065.
The court relies on Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S.363(1982) and its explanation of the continuing violation doctrine.
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